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Abstract
We compare different actual forms of democracy and analyse in which
way they are variations of a “natural consensus decision process”. We
analyse how “consensus decision followed by majority voting” is open
to “false play” by the majority, and investigate how other types of false
play appear in alternative types of democratic decision procedures. We
introduce the combined notion of “quantum parliament” and “quan-
tum decision procedure”, and prove it to be the only one, when applied
after consensus decision, that is immune to false play.
1 Introduction
The aim of this article is to present a proposal for a new form of democracy.
We will give an explicit description of the structure of this new democracy
in the sections that follow. I decided to write a contribution on this topic
for the book “Worldviews, Science and Us: Redemarcating Knowledge and
its Social and Ethical Implications”, because I was inspired to elaborate
this structure for a new form of democracy primordially while reflecting on
the nature of natural processes in the world. It was when reflecting on the
nature of “quantum processes” that I had a sudden insight that brought
several pieces of a puzzle together. More specifically, it became clear to me
how a possible remedy can be proposed for profound shortcomings of the
democratic process in our actual society. I found it to be a good example of
how reflections on one scientific discipline can lead to fruitful insights in a
seemingly completely different scientific field. This proposal for a new form
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of democracy is, however, not a mere attempt to apply insights into the
nature of quantum processes to the political processes in our society. It is
just as firmly rooted in personal political reflections generated by a long-felt
concern about “what is going on with our western democratic systems”.
For years I have been formulating, both in private and in circles of close
friends, varying critiques of the functioning and practice of our democratic
system. I have, however, never made an effort to write down any of these
analyses, except for a short text that however remained in the form of a
preprint, and its English version [1, 2]. Finally, a variety of reflections came
together as pieces of a puzzle, and while I was reflecting on the nature of
quantum processes, made me see how a new form of democracy could be
presented that would be worthwhile considering as an alternative to our
current models.
2 Democracies
The word “democracy” originates from the Greek “demos” (“the people”)
and “kratein” (“to rule”). Hence the original meaning of democracy was:
“Rule by the People”. When referring to “a democracy”, we therefore mean
a form of government in which ordinary citizens take part, in contrast with
a monarchy or dictatorship [3, 4].
This article concentrates on the type of democracy that is now spreading
all over the world, and that emerged in West-Europe in the past centuries,
with roots in Ancient Greece [5, 6]. This type of democracy is often called
“representative democracy”. It comprises a form of government in which
voters choose, in free, secret and multi-party elections, representatives to act
in their interests. Globally, in 2004, a substantial part of the world’s people
live in representative democracies, including constitutional monarchies with
a strong representative branch [4].
Let us call a representative democracy that works along the mechanism of
“majority voting” a “majority rule democracy”. In practice, this means that
a specific proposal that is debated in a nation’s assembly of representatives,
e.g. parliament, will be accepted if and only if more than 50% of such
representatives vote in favour. If the 50% is not attained, the proposal is
rejected. A higher percentage of votes in favour is necessary, usually two
thirds of the totality of votes, if the proposal introduces a change in the
constitution of the nation. This means that the constitution plays the role
of a more stable and less easy to change set of rules.
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2.1 Majority rule democracy
“The strongest is never strong enough to be always the mas-
ter, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into
duty” (Jean Jacques Rousseau in [7])
We want to concentrate on the aspect of majority voting that takes place in
a majority rule democracy. Majority voting constitutes in effect a kind of
“right of the strongest” in disguise. If in principle the majority always gains,
it is the biggest group, and hence the strongest opinion, that always has to
be followed after the voting has taken place. One of our critiques of existing
democracies is related to this aspect of majority voting. We want to analyse
many of its aspects, and hence not only the immoral aspect, as suggested
by the above quote from Jean Jacques Rousseau [7]. Rousseau argued that
“the strongest is never strong enough to be always the master”,[7] and hence
that the “right of the majority” confers a much more intrinsic power upon
the strongest than is the case for the “strongest in nature”. Apart from this
ethical aspect, we will come to the conclusion that there are other aspects
that make majority rule democracy not the best candidate for a democracy.
It is commonly accepted that a majority rule democracy should not
be identified as an ethical form of democracy. A majority rule democracy
is defended usually for purely pragmatic and practical reasons: it is argued
that other types of democracy, the ones that do not adopt the majority rule,
are inefficient, because decision making takes too much time and energy of
the group of representatives. Let us consider the most important of these
other types of democracy, namely the “consensus democracy”.
2.2 Consensus democracy
Consensus democracy is the application of consensus to the process of leg-
islation. Consensus is a process for group decision-making. It is a method
by which an entire group of people can come to an agreement. The input
and ideas of all participants are gathered and synthesised to arrive at a final
decision acceptable to all.
Consensus decision making is of a higher ethical standard, because it
is based on the principle that every voice is worth hearing, and that every
concern is justified. If a proposal makes any number of people, even if only
one person, deeply unhappy, it is considered that there is a valid reason for
that unhappiness, and that ignoring it might be a mistake. The pursuit
of consensus not only aims to achieve better solutions but also to foster a
sense of community and trust. With consensus, people can and should work
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through differences and reach a mutually satisfactory position. It is possible
for one person’s insights or strongly held beliefs to sway the whole group.
No ideas are lost, each member’s input is valued as part of the solution.
But, there are good reasons to be sceptic about a consensus democracy
in practice, because indeed it will often take a very long time to reach agree-
ment. This makes a consensus democracy, although ethically of a higher
standard than the majority rule democracy, not a very useful form of democ-
racy in practice. It often happens that new institutions start with the im-
plementation of a consensus democratic structure, because members can feel
safe then that they will not have to submit to a majority vote decision whose
outcome would be very bad for the people they represent. The European
Union is an example of an institution that makes use of such a consensus de-
cision structure. Usually, however, such institutions tend to evolve steadily
towards a majority rule democracy, the argument being that the consensus
democracy “does not work in practice”, and leads to too much inefficiency.
In the case of the European Union, the complaint is that many important
decisions are just not taken, because if one of the members does not agree
the result is that “nothing happens”. The question: “Why does a consensus
democratic system not work in practice?” is one of the key issues that we
will try to analyse in this article.
3 Natural and procedural decision processes
If a group of friends decides to go for a walk in the nearby forest on a sunny
Sunday afternoon, their decisions have to be mutually agreed on, e.g. the
question “will we stop for a drink in that pub along the way?”, will most
probably be resolved in some kind of “natural way”. What do we mean
by “natural”? We mean that no “well defined procedure of how to take
decisions” was agreed upon before the friends started out on their walk.
This is the way that most of the decisions that involve a group of people
are taken in our everyday world. We will call the decision process that
takes place in this way a “natural decision process”. A decision process that
follows a well defined procedure we will call a “procedural decision process”.
Sometimes, the distinction between a natural decision process and a
procedural decision process is not strict, for example, a process that started
as a natural decision process may well end up as a procedural one, if it still
fails to yield results after a reasonable amount of time has elapsed. Suppose
that during their walk the group of friends gets strongly divided over the
question of whether they will have a drink in the pub or not, and that
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they cannot reach agreement including after discussing the matter at some
length; it could well be that one of them proposes to vote on the issue, so
that the natural decision process is changed into a procedural one, at least,
if all agree to this change. As a first remark, we should note that for any
type of procedural decision process going on in a group of people it will at
least be necessary to have a consensus about the procedure to be followed
in the procedural decision process amongst this group of people. However,
although this may not seem to be the case at first sight, procedural decision
processes have a deeply different structure as compared to natural decision
processes. To show this is the subject of the next section.
3.1 Boycott and false play in procedural decision systems
Let us look in some more detail at the European Union. For many issues
that a majority of the member countries agreed upon, no decisions have
been taken, not even in an amended form, because some members, or in-
deed only a single member nation, did not agree. This has happened on
many occasions within the “procedural consensus decision system” that the
European Union adopts. We claim that this phenomenon does not typify
the “natural decision system”. If we return to the group of friends taking a
walk on a sunny Sunday afternoon, and if we suppose that no agreement is
reached on any of the decisions to be taken, it would be very plausible for
the group to decide to have a vote on the matter so as yet to find agreement.
But, even before they “decide to have a vote”, many other options might
have been considered. In any case, what is clear is that most probably the
group of friends will not allow their afternoon to be spoiled because a few or
only one of them disagrees about what the others want to do, threatening
to boycott the entire walk. The reason why such a boycott by a small mi-
nority, or one person, rarely happens in everyday life, is because in everyday
life no fixed decision procedure has been agreed upon. Friends intending to
have a pleasant walk in the forest together will not decide beforehand on a
procedure to be followed in case they should stumble upon a disagreement
that cannot be resolved without a procedure. The natural decision process
is open to any kind of procedure at any moment, and it is exactly for this
reason that it cannot be reduced to a specific procedural decision process. A
procedural decision process that can be adapted at any moment and as often
as required is comparable to the natural decision process, but even such a
highly complex procedural decision process would be only an approximation
of the natural one.
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3.2 Pure consensus and majority consensus
The European Commission follows the simplest consensus decision proce-
dure of all, namely “if no consensus is reached no decision is taken”. Let us
call this the “pure consensus system”. The weakness of this pure consensus
system is its vulnerability to boycotting by a small minority, which may even
be a single representative. Indeed, if the procedure of the pure consensus
system is known by every representative, it will be easy to boycott the whole
process by just “not allowing consensus to be reached in the time available”.
One of the possibilities to avoid such a boycott is to introduce a different
consensus procedure. In this procedure, a consensus is looked for initially,
but if it cannot be reached, the procedure of majority voting is followed.
Let us call this the “majority consensus system”. This procedure is open
to false play too, however. If the majority consensus system is adopted, the
group of representatives will first look for a consensus, but if no consensus is
reached after a given time, which is fixed before the process starts, they will
change to the system of majority voting. No boycott of the decision is yet
possible, but false play is, obviously. Indeed, the majority may well decide
to prevent consensus from being reached, because they know that this will
be followed by a majority vote, so that they will have the decision in the
way they want it to be, without the need for consensus.
This means that the majority consensus system is open to false play
by the majority, just as the pure consensus system is open to boycott by
the minority. Both procedures, pure consensus and majority consensus, are
very different from the natural decision process that we find around us in
everyday life. Can we find a procedural model that resembles more the
natural decision process?
3.3 Random consensus
Let us make the situation that we are considering somewhat more concrete,
such that we can look for alternative procedural decision models. Suppose
that an assembly of representatives consisting of n people is gathering, where
n is sufficiently large, for example 100 ≤ n . They discuss a specific measure
and different decisions in relation with this measure are considered and pro-
posed. Suppose that after a period of discussion two alternative decisions
are left, so that the assembly will try to reach consensus considering both
of them. However, no consensus ensues in the period of time available. A
majority of the representatives, let us say n − 1, is in favour of decision A,
and one representative is in favour of decision B. The two types of decision
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procedures that we have considered so far would produce the following re-
sults. The pure consensus system would result in “no decision” being made
meaning that, in the perceptions of the n − 1 persons who are in favour of
decision A, the one person in favour of decision B has boycotted the over-
all process. The majority consensus system, for its part, would result in
decision A being taken.
Suppose that a society using the majority consensus system has become
aware of (i) its unethical nature, and also, even more importantly, (ii) the
obvious possibility of false play and, as a consequence, of a “forced decision”,
and suppose that it wants to do something about it. More particularly, a way
is investigated to “protect” the minority, in our example, only one person
out of n, who might, however, be representing a lot of people. The following
procedure could be proposed, which we will call the “random consensus
system”. If no consensus is reached after a well defined period, a random
process is organised to determine which of the alternatives will be chosen.
In the case of our specific example, this would come to tossing a coin and
choosing for decision A if the coin shows head and decision B if the coin
shows tail. Obviously, the minority gains by this random consensus system
as compared with the majority consensus system. In the case of our specific
example, the one representative gains a lot, because suddenly there is a fifty–
fifty chance of decision B or decision A being taken. But if all representatives
know in advance that this random consensus system is going to be applied,
it can be falsely used by the minority this time, in much the same way as the
majority consensus system can be falsely used by the majority. Indeed, the
minority, in our case the one representative who is in favour of decision B,
may well boycott the process of consensus, because he or she knows that after
the time for consensus has passed, the coin will be tossed, leaving him or her
with a 50 % chance of his or her preferred decision being taken in its pure
form, instead of a consensus decision, which, given that n−1 representatives
are in favour of decision A, will anyhow be closer to decision A than to
decision B. Our conclusion is that just as the majority consensus system
invites false play by the majority, preventing real consensus, the random
consensus system invites false play by the minority, equally preventing real
consensus.
4 Quantum democracy
In the introduction of this article I said that it was reflecting on the nature
of quantum processes that made me see how it would be possible to propose
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a solution to some of the problems of our democratic system. Already years
ago, I used to give the example to my students of what I then called a
“quantum parliament”. Let me explain what such a quantum parliament is,
and why I found it an interesting idea at that time.
4.1 Quantum parliament
Suppose one considers a classical parliament, such as the ones we know.
This means that we have an overall group of representatives constituting
the parliament, and subgroups whose members belong to different political
parties. Let us be more concrete, and suppose that we have a parliament of
n representatives, and that there are five parties, which we will call A, B, C,
D and E, where nA, nB, nC , nD and nE are the number of representatives
belonging to parties A, B, C, D and E. This means that
nA + nB + nC + nD + nE = n (1)
Usually, a government is composed of a collection of parties such that the
sum of the representatives of all the composing parties is more than or equal
to n/2. As a consequence, whenever the parliament has to vote on a certain
proposition, the government can “in some way” obtain a majority vote for
this proposition, and hence have it decided the way the government wants.
This indeed is the case if all representatives of the parties that constitute the
government follow the government’s opinion in their parliament vote. We
stated “in some way”, because in principle this does not have to be and even
should not be the case. Indeed, in all western democracies there is a strict
division amongst the three powers: (1) the executive power, in the hands
of the administrative branch of the government, including ministers, the
cabinet, civil servants, the police and the army; (2) the legislative power, in
the hands of the lawmakers, effectively the representatives of the parliament;
and (3) the judiciary power, more concretely the enforcers of the law, the
judges, magistrates and tribunals. But in practice, parliamentary decisions
are often made by its members that belong to the government. Apart from
this, all parliaments in western democracies decide through majority voting,
which means that they give rise to a majority rule democracy.
The quantum parliament follows a probability procedure, hence partly as
referred to in section 3.3, but also different. The probabilities are weighted
by means of the sizes of the different decision groups. More concretely, this
means the following: we develop a random machinery, such that the parties
A, B, C, D and E, respectively, are attributed probabilities p(A) = nA
n
,
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p(B) = nB
n
, p(C) = nC
n
, p(D) = nD
n
and p(E) = nE
n
. From (1) it follows
that
p(A) + p(B) + p(C) + p(D) + p(E) = 1 (2)
which means that we can interpret p(A) (or p(B), p(C), p(D), p(E), respec-
tively) as the probability of party A (or B, C, D, E, respectively) deciding.
Hence the quantum parliament is different from a majority rule par-
liament, because decisions are taken following a random procedure, which
means that also the smallest party can win, but it is also different from a
random consensus system, where each party would have an equal chance to
win. For each party, the chances to win are proportional to its size; hence
the bigger a party, the greater its chance to win.
4.2 Quantum consensus
Our proposal for a quantum consensus system is the following. Suppose
a specific proposal is made that requires a parliamentary vote. There is a
particular period of time available for seeking consensus, which is decided
on beforehand. After this time has run out, the quantum parliament is to
decide. Concretely, this means that a probabilistic procedure is carried out
such that the majority has a probability proportional to its size to win the
vote, and equally so the minority has a probability proportional to its size
to win the vote. In other words, although the majority has more chance to
win, the minority will always have a chance to win too, however small it
may be.
It is interesting to point out at this stage that this quantum consensus
system is not subject to “false play” and/or boycotting in the way that a
pure consensus system, a majority consensus system or a random consensus
system is. A pure consensus system can be easily boycotted by the minority,
since it will not be followed by a decision vote. The majority consensus
system is typically boycotted by the majority. They know that they just
have to wait for the voting to win with certainty. The random consensus
system is typically boycotted again on the initiative of the minority. Indeed,
the minority increases its power by waiting until a pure random decision is
made. A quantum consensus system is free from all these flaws. Indeed, if
the majority decided to boycott, they might lose the vote to the minority
because of the randomness of the procedure. The minority will not be
tempted to boycott the consensus either. Although they still have a chance
to win if they opt for boycotting the consensus and waiting for the vote,
their chance is definitely smaller than that of the majority, which makes
this strategy less attractive to them than seeking consensus.
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The quantum consensus system is the only procedure that will stimulate
both sides, majority as well as minority, to strive for real consensus. It
is the only procedure that avoids that there is any benefit in boycotting
the consensus for either side, majority or minority. Nor does it entail the
disadvantage of the pure consensus procedure, namely that it takes too long
for a decision to follow. In the quantum consensus system, a fixed time is
reserved for consensus, after which the quantum parliament can decide in
a wink. This means that the quantum consensus system can offer a real,
efficient, workable and ethically balanced consensus decision procedure.
4.3 Natural and procedural, the aspect of determinism
In this section we reflect about “why there is a fundamental difference be-
tween a natural and a procedural decision process”, “why the quantum con-
sensus system is a good model for the natural decision process”, and “what
these insights tell us about the nature of processes in general”.
The types of boycotts and false plays that we mentioned in relation with
the different versions of procedural decision processes are only possible be-
cause decision processes are instruments used by human beings, who have
the gift of foresight. Moreover, they are only possible because procedural
decision processes contain a definite deterministic aspect. For example, the
procedure of a procedural majority decision process is close to determinis-
tic, which means that once the majority and minority are known and fixed,
the outcome will be virtually known and fixed. Boycotting and false play
find their origin in this possibility of “knowing the future”. It is potential
future events that influence the present through the minds of the people
involved in the process. Human minds manage to create a causal chain from
“future potential” to “present actual”. Since any procedure that is fixed
and free from any randomness increases the potential of the human mind
to forecast the future, it also fortifies the causal link between future poten-
tial and present actual. Once randomness is introduced in the procedural
process, the potential to forecast the future will decrease, approaching the
level of a natural decision process. This similarity is most pronounced if the
introduced randomness is quantum.
We know that causal effects of potential future to actual present also exist
in the realm of the micro-world through the effect of “non-locality”. The
question arises whether the origin and structure of quantum randomness is
not linked to the function we pointed out in relation with decision processes,
namely that the quantum consensus system is the only procedural decision
process that demotivates the “false play type” of use of this causal “future to
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present effect”. There might be a Darwinian element of evolution involved
that in the long term makes the quantum process fitter than any other, and
such that it was selected in the course of time for the entities populating
the micro-world. Our analysis also indicates that the quantum formalism
and more specifically the quantum superposition state might deliver a good
model for consensus as a state within a process. We plan to investigate these
questions in depth within the approach that we put forward in [8, 9, 10, 11].
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